Tenzer Strategics

In his 183rd in-depth essay for his international politics journal, Tenzer Strategics, Nicolas Tenzer endeavors to draw some long-term lessons from the events that shook Ukrainian society about ten days ago. The protests that accompanied Fedorov’s dismissal and led to General Syrsky’s replacement warrant a more comprehensive look at the Ukrainian nation itself.
In particular, it would be simplistic—even if this dimension does exist—to view these events merely as a reiteration of the conflict between the “Old Guard” and the “Modernists.”
In the first part, he shows how this issue should be considered in conjunction with the fundamental reality of Ukrainian society: that of a nation in arms. This essential fact is the foundation not only of the Ukrainian nation but also of Ukrainian democracy. The involvement of civilians in the war—including their support for the military (sometimes through the provision of vehicles), the design and use of drones before they were fully integrated into the military, and, of course, the sacrifices themselves—calls for a “war democracy.”
This is the very essence of a “democratic war,” which Nicolas examines in the second part of his paper. Not only, of course, is this, from the Ukrainian perspective, a war for democracy, freedom, justice, and the rule of law, but the war is also democratic in its conduct. Regardless of the discipline it requires, it can only be effective if it is the subject of political debates—sometimes the most heated ones—regarding its methods, if not its very ends. Here the author develops a detailed analysis of the three sources of authority—in the sense understood by Hannah Arendt—that currently govern Ukraine: the president, who possesses authority as a commander-in-chief—which is not the case for a president in peacetime—the Ukrainian nation as such, and democracy itself. He shows how these three are intertwined and what this implies—including the absence of any compromise with Russia, an attitude that, moreover, is dictated by reason and realism.
In a third section, Nicolas also does not shy away from addressing the unique difficulties that Ukrainian society will face after its victory: divisions exist, resentments will persist, and trauma will accompany many Ukrainians for decades to come. We must face these realities head-on as well. But the democratic experience of the war will also, in this context, offer hope for healing. What fundamentally distinguishes Ukrainian society from Russian “society”—he believes the term is, in fact, inadequate in the latter case—is that the former, even in its darkest moments, has never ceased to look toward the future, whereas the latter is marked by the absence of such a future.

Ukrainian Society: What Does It Mean to Be a Nation in Arms? Unity, Quarrels, and Healing

This 182nd long essay on Nicolas Tenzer's international politics journal, Tenzer Strategics—a bit more than just a blog, as one of his friends recently told him—is an attempt to explore the very nature of geostrategy—a term he prefers to “geopolitics.” It joins other articles published in the same venue that explore the theoretical foundations enabling us to better understand the nature of international relations. Yet it is far from being a purely intellectual exercise.
The starting point that seems to the author to be essential remains, time and again, crime and radical evil—the ultimate significance of which many leaders struggle to grasp.
The first part aims to address the fundamental flaw in classical geopolitics, which, in a certain sense, reasons much like Augustinian theology based on original sin. It effectively makes crime the insurmountable matrix of international relations, to the point of excluding it from analysis and denying its significance and explanatory value in the conduct of certain regimes.
Nicolas's second part may seem more traditional. However, it thoroughly reevaluates the value of interdisciplinarity in the study of international relations. The aim here is not only to demonstrate its necessity but also to tackle it in a specific way, using a two-step method, in the analysis of the relationships between peoples and states. It is thus shown that many democratic governments have committed the error of both failing to appreciate the specificity of each event—particularly the most monstrous ones—while refusing to situate them within the long arc of history. Nor have they recognized how some of these events—the Russian war against Ukraine, the destruction of the Syrian people by Assad and his allies, and the undermining of international law—had, in a sense, been made possible, or even set in motion, quite some time ago.
The third part is a reflection on the radicalization of the international scene. It has often been overshadowed by broad, sweeping concepts—the rise of China, the misleading analogy with the Cold War, the crises in Africa, etc.—which have prevented an understanding of what was actually at work. There has been a sort of chiasm between the proliferation of multilateral regulatory systems and the unraveling of norms in reality. Without grasping the radical nature of these developments, political leaders are doomed to take only peripheral action.

What Is Geostrategy About? The Radical Reality and the Absent Gaze

In this 181st long-read on his international politics blog, Tenzer Strategics, Nicolas Tenzer explores the prospects for a Ukrainian victory and a Russian defeat, even if these are not to be expected in the coming months. The decisive strikes carried out by the Ukrainians against Russian energy and military infrastructure are leading—perhaps for the first time—some European leaders to no longer view a Ukrainian victory as mere wishful thinking. This essay is also an article on history.
The first part of this piece is devoted to Crimea, which may well soon become an island. This is a substantial shift in the situation, and Nicolas outlines its strategic and political consequences, even though retaking the peninsula will not be so straightforward, as he explains.
The second part focuses on the obstacles that remain before Kyiv can achieve a complete victory over Russia, as the Ukrainian Chief of Staff recently emphasized. This is where Europeans must act now by creating the conditions that will allow the Ukrainian armed forces to overcome the difficulties that remain on the front lines. They must also guard against the notion that the Russian economy, though in tatters, will collapse immediately—much less that Putin will be swiftly strengthened by a palace coup.
As the author details in Part Three, Europeans have somewhat set aside their talk of concessions and peace, and that is a good thing. But their resolve remains too fragile. The Ukrainians have shown that they are capable of setting the agenda. Europeans are beginning to understand that, for their own security, they must follow suit. Now is the time to see this through to the end and make a strategic break that still faces obstacles that are less intellectual than mental.
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Ukraine Will Win. Let’s Not Miss the Train of History Again! Let’s Not Wait for Minerva’s Owl!

Much has already been written about the Memorandum of Understanding signed between and the . All foreign policy analysts have described it as a disaster, a consented defeat for America, a capitulation, a rout...
In this 180th in-depth paper on his international politics blog, Tenzer Strategics, Nicolas Tenzer shows—by examining other, rarely mentioned aspects of this preliminary agreement—that if it were to be implemented globally as is, it would be even worse than what has been reported. It also leaves fundamental questions unanswered.
In this essay, he focuses in particular on three dimensions: legal, security, and principled.
The first section, on legal issues, addresses four aspects: freedom of navigation without tolls in the straits, as defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (known as the Montego Bay Convention); the issue of sanctions, viewed through a legal lens; Lebanon’s sovereignty; and the subversion of the multilateral system.
The second part, devoted to security issues, demonstrates why the draft agreement would not only worsen the security situation in the region but, step by step, would constitute a threat to global security. It would ultimately undermine the credibility of U.S. power and could lead to new, disastrous agreements.
Finally, the third part emphasizes, in particular, the legitimizing effect that signing the agreement would have on a rogue state. Here, too, the destruction of the world begins with the forgetting of crimes.
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The Potential Agreement Between Iran and the United States Is Even Worse Than Has Been Explained A Radical Undermining of International Legal Principles and Security

Five years ago, on June 13, 2021, Nicolas Tenzer launched the international politics blog Tenzer Strategics. On this anniversary, he is publishing his 179th essay, in which he looks back on the past five years.
As a guiding thread, he has chosen the parable—and the paradox—of Zeno’s arrow. One can certainly argue that these five years have been rich in major events—from the defining moment of Russia’s war against Ukraine, through Trump’s reelection, to the more recent war in Iran—but at the same time, a long-term analysis makes it difficult to perceive any breaks or disruptions. It is as if all events, even the most extreme ones, were already inscribed in the fabric of reality.
In this paper, Nicolas endeavors to explore these various elements: the transition of the Russian war against Ukraine, which began in 2014, into a total war of extermination, was already inherent in Putin’s ideology, which the author had described well before 2022; Trump’s reelection was one of the scenarios seriously considered, and it had been written many times that his second presidency would be far worse than the first; the hyper-ideological dimension of Chinese power, beyond other aspects, was evident from the very first years of Xi Jinping’s term.
In this article, Nicolas Tenzer also examines Europe, which, while realizing far too late—despite all the warning signs—its isolation and the mortal threats it would face, has obviously begun to strengthen itself; yet this awareness has not yet been accompanied by proportionate action, despite substantial progress in this regard as well.
A series of concepts he has elaborated on here over the past five years—ranging from the question of evil in foreign policy, realism, the role of individual actors, the strategic importance of international law, the historical inscription of disaster, decision-making processes, and even the question of leadership—may help us explore the blind spots in international politics that persist today.
Today, only Ukraine seems determined to break the continuity of denial—as evidenced by the pitiful attempts by some to engage in dialogue with Russia—because it knows that our own inaction leads Russian missiles to strike Ukrainian children. We live in seemingly different times; reclaiming time—the time of urgency—is the only way to avoid being swallowed up.
And to celebrate this fifth anniversary, until tomorrow (Monday, June 15, in the evening), we’re offering a 25% discount on your one-year subscription to Tenzer Strategics. You will thus enjoy full access to all 179 essays published.

Looking Back—The Announcement Made to the World Five Years Later: Ut Cuspis…

This 178th in-depth analysis on Nicolas Tenzer's international politics blog, Tenzer Strategics, is devoted to what is happening in — and regarding Ukraine. The title speaks for itself: the collapse is ’s; the strategy is the one that we, the Allies, lack—or at least have not yet developed after 12 and a half years of Moscow’s war against Kyiv, including four and a half years of all-out war.
In a lengthy introduction, Nicolas highlights a number of realities on the ground that people are finally beginning to discuss—he was, in fact, somewhat alone when, in 2022, he said that the Kremlin could not win the war... Everything today points to Russia’s impending defeat, a possible—though certainly not yet immediate—victory for Ukraine, but also, because we must speak of it every day, the mass crimes committed by Moscow.
In the first part, he shows that the worst mistake—now that the prospect of Russia’s collapse is finally recognized as a possible scenario—would be to refuse to deliver the coup de grâce. the author examines the three absurd narratives that explain this refusal, while dismantling them one by one.
Above all, it seemed essential to hims—and this is the focus of his second part—to consider what comes next, that is, the post-Russian-defeat era. For the rout in Ukraine is not the final stage of a possible strategy; we must think through and organize Russia’s defeat over the long term and, to that end, have a strategy for Russia that neither Washington DC—even before Trump—nor Western capitals possess. Here Nicolas details all the elements of such a strategy of defeat—legal, economic, geostrategic, and military.
Finally,in his third part, he explores what Ukraine’s future role will be, far beyond its primary contribution to the security of Europe and part of the rest of the world. He shows why and how Ukraine will be Europe’s driving force, diplomatically, technologically, and of course intellectually. Without Ukraine, Europe would be weaker and could more easily slip back into insignificance and historical irrelevance. But it cannot be ruled out that this is also the current fear of certain European leaders: becoming marginalized in Europe while they clung to the illusory dreams of sustained greatness.

The Collapse and the Strategy We Must Seize the Historic Opportunity Presented By Russia’s Inevitable Defeat

In this 177th long-form post on his international politics blog, Tenzer Strategics, Nicolas Tenzer examines the transatlantic relationship.
Already faltering before the Trump presidency, it was completely shattered by it. The lost trust will not be restored even if a decent leader replaces the real estate magnate in 2029.
In the first part, Nicolas reviews the wars lost by the United States, as well as the actions it failed to take. In terms of security for America’s allies, beyond the two world wars for which we owe it an eternal debt, the United States was valued above all for its deterrence—it thus historically averted a catastrophe that would have subjugated Europe to Soviet rule. But this deterrence, particularly in its conventional form, is now the subject of strong and well-founded doubts. The Trump factor, given his collusion with Moscow, is an aggravating factor, but not entirely new.
In the second part of his essay, I focuses specifically on Europe. On the one hand, it is true that the American withdrawal—to put it mildly—has forced Europe to rearm, and that is a good thing. But we should not jump, on the other hand, to the conclusion that this is good news for Europe. In other regions of the world that pose a security challenge for Europe—the Middle East, Africa, Asia—the fact that it can no longer count on Washington is a major problem. Will it be able, on its own, or even in alliance with other powers as he suggested in his book The End of Great Power Politics, to assume the role of a global provider of security?
In any case, if a “smart” president is elected in 2028, both the United States and Europe will have to engage in strategic introspection. America cannot simply return to a “pre-Trump” era as if nothing had happened. The United States will need to develop a strategy—which was previously nonexistent—toward Russia, China, Africa, and the Middle East. If it intends to restore the transatlantic bond, this strategy must be shared, which will require it to revise its traditional doctrine of national interest. This also applies to the economic, financial, and technological spheres. It will no longer be able to assume a position of dominance or act as the sole rule-maker. Nor can Europe afford to neglect long-term strategic thinking or abandon “de-risking” with regard to Washington. It must become an ally that is itself coherent and sufficiently strong to hold its own in a balanced discussion. The author cannot say today whether these two developments are realistic.
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Trump Has Exposed America’s Strategic Drift and Void This Is Not Necessarily Good News For Europe

In this 176th in-depth essay on his international politics blog, Tenzer Strategics, Nicolas Tenzer examines the fate of post-Orbán Europe. Everyone felt a justified sense of relief following his defeat, given how problematic his collusion with the Russian enemy had become. But Europe is far from healed. The main point of this fairly detailed article is to show that Europe faces major upheavals ahead.
In a fairly substantial introduction, Nicolas demonstrates that complacency—if not worse—toward Moscow remains a dramatic reality in several European countries, even if they lack the influence that Hungary once had. Moreover, the fact that some today continue to consider engaging with Putin is a deeply troubling sign, which he addresses at the end of this essay.
The first part of his essay is devoted to three countries that will face decisive turning points in 2027: Italy, which is not the most alarming case; Poland, which is already more so; and France, above all, which today represents the number one geostrategic risk for next year. I explain why—and this is not solely linked to the worst-case scenario of a far-right candidate winning the presidential election, followed by early parliamentary elections that would produce the same result.
In the second part, he shows that we are in fact facing a largely global ideological war, and that Europe is not winning it, having failed to analyze it early on. The reality is that, in Europe, the defense of the rule of law, the principle of an open society, and freedom often remains weak or, more precisely, negative, and that even moderate left-wing and centrist parties or “traditional” conservatives have failed to develop a positive narrative grounded in the principles that form the foundation of the European project.
Finally, his third part aims to link the defense of the European project to a historical vision of Europe. Nicolas Tenzer shows that it is this history that we have lost or that we are unable to confront and reflect upon. In this regard, he refers to a discourse on Ukraine, which is, today, the only European country to uphold this historical vision inseparable from a social project and a political ideal. But do we, in Europe, have leaders who embody a vision of European history? Another detour via Marc Bloch was also necessary.
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Orbán Was Fortunately Defeated, But Does That Mean Europe Is Saved? Europe’s New Trouble Spots and Its Historical Destiny

Last week, Nicolas Tenzer took a six-day trip to Ukraine (spending four days there). As he has done every year since 2016 (except during the COVID-19 pandemic and in 2022), he had the pleasure of speaking at the Kyiv Security Forum—an exceptional 18th edition. He also participated in three events to launch the Ukrainian translation of his book (published in French by Éditions de l'Observatoire) Our War. Crime and Oblivion (published by Дух і Літера, led by his friend Constantin Sigov).
In this 175th long-read on his IR Tenzer Strategics blog, he draw some lessons from this seventh trip to Ukraine since February 24, 2022.
In the first part, Nicolas reflects on the role of the Allies, or those presumed to be such. Regarding the United States, he shows that the matter is settled, and we all know it: they have switched sides. Never before—even though the bitterness is hardly new—have Ukrainians been so clear on this point. As for Europe, which certainly remains on Kyiv’s side, the reality remains mixed. He discusses at length the ambiguities and the progress that is both expected and necessary.
In the second part, he demonstrates why it is now evident that Ukraine will win the war. Admittedly, the situation on the front lines remains difficult, Russian bombardments of civilians are constant, and no one knows when the Russian economy will collapse completely, but he has never sensed such optimism. He demonstrates why this certainty is rational. The fact remains that the next nine months or the coming year will be tough, and that there is, so to speak, a transitional period during which the Allies must do everything possible to ensure that Ukraine continues to make gains before it is capable of triumphing on its own. Here he outlines some key elements of what our strategy must be—and our narratives must evolve radically.
In this third part, he could not fail to evoke the tradition of Ukrainian culture, which has always been intimately linked, both yesterday and today, to freedom. He offers here a few examples of this. National sentiment is tied to cosmopolitanism, and a society open to the world to the building of a political nation. Ukraine is the quintessential European nation.
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Return From Ukraine – Seven. The Rational Power of a Great Nation The Inevitable Demise of a Pathetic Country: Russia

This 174th long essay on Nicolas Tenzer's IR blog Tenzer Strategics is also the last of six articles (plus a substantial introduction) that Constantin Vaillant-Tenzer and he have devoted to the interactions between artificial intelligence and international relations.
It focuses specifically on the uses of AI in international relations and warfare, and the associated risks. This paper is certainly central to the conversation launched by the authors.
The first part examines in depth the issue of the uses of AI in international relations. Whilst highlighting its potential benefits, it also points out its structural limitations, particularly in decision-making. In particular, they demonstrate that, by its very nature, AI is not leadership driven.
The second part shows how AI fits into a dynamic of increased competition between powers.
The third part, the longest (and itself divided into three distinct sections), explores the various risks and threats associated with AI, covering information manipulation and influence operations, bioterrorism, and the misuse of AI-powered weapons.
A final section explores the issue of regulations, best practices and red lines. Numerous useful and well-founded policy documents exist, but the current state of the world does not lend itself to boundless optimism.
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Artificial Intelligence and Geostrategic Risks New Threats Rather Than a Conceptual Revolution