Sam Rainsy

ពេលដែលគេនិយាយអំពី«តំបន់អភិវឌ្ឍន៍ពិសេស» គឺគេសំដៅទៅលើ «មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឆបោកតាមអនឡាញ»។

២៥ កញ្ញា ២០២៦ / 25 September 2026

ខណៈដែលមេដឹកនាំប្រទេសនានាក្នុងពិភពលោក ប្រមូលផ្តុំគ្នានៅទីក្រុងញូវយ៉ក ដើម្បីថ្លែងសុន្ទរកថានៅមហាសន្និបាតអង្គការសហប្រជាជាតិ ក្នុងបំណងការពារផលប្រយោជន៍ប្រទេសរបស់ខ្លួន នាយករដ្ឋមន្ត្រីកម្ពុជាបែរជាបង្ហាញថា ខ្លួនគ្មានសមត្ថភាពការពារកេរ្តិ៍ឈ្មោះ និងបូរណភាពទឹកដីរបស់ប្រទេសយើងឡើយ។ របប ហ៊ុន សែន បាននាំមកនូវភាពអាម៉ាស់ និងភាពឯកោដល់កម្ពុជា។

As national leaders gather in New York to address the United Nations General Assembly and defend their countries’ interests, Cambodia’s prime minister has shown himself unable to defend our country’s reputation and territorial integrity. The Hun Sen regime has brought shame and isolation upon Cambodia.

ហ៊ុន សែន ចោរលួចជាតិ តែលើកនេះភ្លាត់ស្នៀត លួចលុយពលរដ្ឋពិភពលោក៕
#អរគុណFBI

សេចក្តីអំពាវនាវរបស់រដ្ឋាភិបាលកម្ពុជាឯករាជ្យ ២៣ តុលា ថ្ងៃទី២៣ ខែកញ្ញា ឆ្នាំ២០២៦

English below:

Paris, September 23, 2026

The Independent Cambodian Government of 23 October strongly appeals to representatives of the countries and international institutions, including the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) participating in the International Conference on Combating Online Scams in Cambodia on 23–24 September, to call upon the government of Mr. Hun Manet to undeniably arrest individuals, the major leaders/masterminds of networks involved in widespread online scam operation in Cambodia. Those online scam criminals deserve to be brought to the courts to face formal legal justice.

The major leaders/masterminds include the Oknhas (tycoons) and senior officials within the Hun Manet’s government. Their names have been documented in the reports by various international specialized organizations and western countries, specifically in those of the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union.

The Independent Cambodian Government of 23 October believes that the world can successfully combat and eradicate online scams, only if the government of each country begins taking serious action against the masterminds and leaders of the networks within its own territory.

របប ហ៊ុន សែន មិនអាចដោះស្រាយវិបត្តិសេដ្ឋកិច្ចកម្ពុជា ដែលកាន់តែធ្ងន់ធ្ងរឡើង បានទេ។ ជនរងគ្រោះគឺជាពលរដ្ឋខ្មែរ។

កម្ពុជាកំពុងប្រឈមនឹងការធ្លាក់ចុះនៃកំណើនសេដ្ឋកិច្ចដែលអាចបន្តរហូតដល់ឆ្នាំ ២០២៧ ដោយសារគំរូកំណើនចាស់ដែលពឹងផ្អែកលើវិស័យអចលនទ្រព្យ ឥណទាន ការវិនិយោគពីចិន ទេសចរណ៍ និងកម្លាំងពលកម្មថ្លៃទាប កំពុងបាត់បង់សន្ទុះ។ វិស័យអចលនទ្រព្យ និងធនាគារកំពុងរងសម្ពាធ តម្រូវការក្នុងស្រុក និងប្រាក់ផ្ញើពីពលករនៅក្រៅប្រទេសកំពុងថយចុះ ខណៈការរំខានតាមព្រំដែនកម្ពុជា-ថៃ ការកើនឡើងថ្លៃថាមពល ការពឹងផ្អែកលើការនាំចេញមួយចំនួន និងបញ្ហាកេរ្តិ៍ឈ្មោះពាក់ព័ន្ធនឹងឧក្រិដ្ឋកម្មឆបោកតាមអនឡាញ កំពុងបង្កើនហានិភ័យបន្ថែម។ ជាមួយនឹងភាពទន់ខ្សោយផ្នែកស្ថាប័ន ការធ្វើពិពិធកម្មសេដ្ឋកិច្ចនៅមានកម្រិត និងផលិតភាពមិនទាន់ខ្ពស់ កម្ពុជាត្រូវការផ្លាស់ប្តូរទៅរកគំរូសេដ្ឋកិច្ចដែលមានចីរភាពជាងមុន ដោយផ្តោតលើស្ថាប័នរឹងមាំ ជំនាញ បច្ចេកវិទ្យា ផលិតភាព និងការវិនិយោគដែលមានភាពចម្រុះ។

សហគមមន៍អន្តរជាតិ បានចេញរបាយការណ៍ជាបន្តបន្ទាប់​ដោយ​រកឃើញថា បណ្ដាញនៅពីក្រោយ ការ​ឆបោក​តាមអនឡាញនៅកម្ពុជា គឺជាប់ពាក់ព័ន្ធនិងអ្នកមានអំណាច ក្រុមគ្រួសារត្រកូលហ៊ុន។ អ្នកជំនាញសេដ្ឋកិច្ចលើកឡើងថា សេដ្ឋកិច្ចរបស់រដ្ឋាភិបាលត្រកូលហ៊ុន គឺពឹងផ្អែកខ្លាំងលើ Scam online នេះ។

21 September 2026

របប ហ៊ុន សែន មិនអាចដោះស្រាយវិបត្តិសេដ្ឋកិច្ចកម្ពុជា ដែលកាន់តែធ្ងន់ធ្ងរឡើង បានទេ

CAMBODIA’S ECONOMIC CRISIS SIGNALS THE END OF A SHORT-SIGHTED GROWTH MODEL

Cambodia’s current economic slowdown is real and is likely to continue at least through 2027. It stems not from a single shock, but from the convergence of several crises: real estate, credit, tourism, relations with Thailand, energy costs, and weakening international confidence.

The IMF estimates that real economic growth, after declining from 6.0% in 2024 to 5.3% in 2025, could fall to around 3% in 2026. The Asian Development Bank is less pessimistic, forecasting 4.1% in 2026 and 4.7% in 2027. The gap between these forecasts illustrates the extent of the uncertainty, but both confirm a marked slowdown. IMF, July 2026, ADB, July 2026.

1. The fading real-estate engine

For years, Cambodia’s growth was largely supported by:

- real-estate investment, particularly from China;
- the construction of housing, hotels, casinos, and commercial buildings;
- rapid growth in bank lending secured by land or property.

This model is now faltering. Many projects have been suspended or remain unsold, land transactions have declined, and quoted prices do not always reflect the prices at which properties could actually be sold.

The real-estate crisis is spreading throughout the economy:

The IMF specifically regards real estate and deteriorating bank asset quality as major risks. The problem may be more serious than the officially reported level of non-performing loans suggests, because repayment deferrals and loan restructurings have delayed the recognition of some losses.

2. Insufficient domestic demand

Weakness in real estate and credit is weighing on the incomes of workers, shopkeepers, subcontractors, and property owners. Indebted households are reducing their spending to continue servicing their loans.

This is resulting in depressed domestic demand:

- lower consumption;
- weaker sales for small businesses;
- reduced private investment;
- greater caution among banks;
- pressure on employment and wages.

This is a cumulative mechanism: fear of an economic slowdown encourages households and businesses to postpone spending, which in turn deepens the slowdown.

3. The tourism shock and the Thai border

The prolonged closure or severe disruption of the border with Thailand is affecting:

- tourist arrivals by land;
- casinos, hotels, restaurants, and border businesses;
- transport and informal trade;
- the supply of certain markets;
- Cambodian migrant workers in Thailand and the remittances they send to their families.

The ADB explicitly cites geopolitical shocks and the prolonged closure of the Thai border among the reasons for its downward revision.

Beyond the border dispute, Cambodia’s tourism industry faces intense regional competition. Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia offer more diversified tourism products, better connectivity, and often better value for money.

4. Declining remittances from migrant workers

The return of some Cambodian workers previously employed in Thailand is producing a double shock:

- they lose all or part of their income;
- their families in Cambodia no longer receive the same level of remittances.

The IMF reports that declining remittances contributed to the deterioration of the current account in 2025. At the same time, Cambodia’s labour market must absorb those returning home while construction and domestic demand are already weak.

5. Highly concentrated and vulnerable exports

Exports remain an important source of support, but they are concentrated in a limited number of sectors:

- garments, footwear, and travel goods;
- bicycles and certain manufactured products;
- agriculture and agro-industry;
- a few emerging electronics activities.

This concentration exposes Cambodia to slowing demand in the US and European markets, changes in tariffs, and competition from countries such as Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Indonesia.

The model based on low-cost labour is also reaching its limits: wages and logistics costs are rising without equivalent gains in productivity, skills, or domestic value added.

6. Higher energy costs and inflation

Cambodia imports much of its fuel and many production inputs. Rising energy prices therefore affect:

- transport;
- electricity and production;
- food prices;
- business costs;
- household purchasing power.

The IMF forecasts average inflation of approximately 5.6% in 2026, compared with 2.5% in 2025; the ADB forecasts 4.5%. Cambodia therefore faces a form of inflationary slowdown: weaker growth combined with higher prices.

This situation is particularly painful for low-income households because their earnings are increasing only slowly, while food, transport, and energy account for a large share of their budgets.

7. Dependence on China

China remains an essential source of investment, tourists, and financing. However, China’s property crisis, greater investor caution, and reduced capital outflows are weakening the momentum from which Cambodia previously benefited.

The problem is not merely the quantitative decline in Chinese capital. Some previous investments were heavily concentrated in real estate, casinos, and projects with limited integration into the wider economy. They generated economic activity, but not necessarily a diversified and sustainable industrial base.

8. Scam centres and reputational damage

The IMF explicitly mentions the reputational damage associated with scam activities. This can affect:

- tourism;
- the confidence of legitimate investors;
- relations with international banks;
- the cost of financial-compliance controls;
- the country’s overall image.

This is therefore no longer merely a criminal or diplomatic problem. It has become a genuine macroeconomic and financial risk. A damaged reputation discourages productive investment precisely when Cambodia needs to replace speculative capital with higher-quality industrial investment.

9. Institutional weaknesses limiting economic transformation

The current difficulties reveal deeper weaknesses:

- legal uncertainty and uneven enforcement of rules;
- corruption and close ties between political, banking, and real-estate interests;
- insufficient statistical transparency;
- inadequate professional and technical skills;
- relatively high electricity and logistics costs;
- limited production diversification;
- a narrow tax system dependent on a limited number of taxpayers.

These factors prevent the transition from growth based on land, credit, and low-cost labour to growth based on productivity, technology, and the rule of law.

Outlook for 2026–2027

The most likely scenario is not necessarily a recession in the strict sense, but growth that is far too weak to:

- absorb new entrants into the labour market;
- provide jobs for workers returning from Thailand;
- reduce poverty significantly;
- resolve real-estate and banking difficulties;
- quickly restore the growth rates of 6–7% previously recorded.

Conclusion

The current slowdown primarily reflects a crisis in Cambodia’s growth model. The country had relied on four engines—real estate, credit, Chinese capital, and low-wage industries—which are all losing momentum simultaneously.

External tensions are accelerating this process, but they are not its sole cause. Without cleaning up bank balance sheets, resolving real-estate problems transparently, strengthening the rule of law, credibly combating criminal networks, diversifying industry, and investing in skills, any recovery in 2027 is likely to remain weak and fragile.

In other words, Cambodia is not merely experiencing a cyclical slowdown: it is reaching the end of a growth model that must be fundamentally renewed.

Sam Rainsy